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NOTE AND COMMENT
TAXATION-INTERNAL REVENUE Ac.-Under the federal Revenue Act
of i921 the taxable profit or deductible loss on sales of stock, bonds and other

property is the actual profit or loss, if the purchase was after February I,
1913. Act, § 2o2 (a). The tax payer (other than a corporation) may,
however, at his option, pay a flat tax of 1232% on his profit, provided he
has held the property more than two years, and provided further that he
first deducts losses on other property, and provided further, that his total
tax is at least 1232% of his total net income. See Act, § 206.
If the purchase was before March I, 1913, the taxable profit is the actual
profit, but not more than the profit compared with March I, 1913, and the
deductible loss is the actual loss, but not more than the loss as compared
with March I, 1913. The following rules show the application of the Act,
using $ as the original cost.
(I) Original cost $I; value 1913, $2; selling price $3-result, $r taxable

profit. Act § 202 (b) (I). Or the taxpayer may pay i2l2% flat as stated
above. Under the prior Act, trust estate stock worth $561,798.oo, March I,
1913, and' sold for $1,28o,996 in 1917 shows a taxable profit for the difference.
Merchants L. & T. Co. v. Smietanka, 255 U. S. 509 (1921).

Where a cor-
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poration sells its assets in 1917 for $6,ooo more than their value March i,
i913, plus additions, less depreciation, the $6,ooo is taxable. Eldorado Coal
Co. v. Mager, 255 U. S. 522 (1921). Stock bought in 1912 for $5oo; worth
$695 March I, 1913, and sold for $13,931 shows a taxable profit of $13,236.
Goodrich v. Edwards, 255 U. S. 527 (1921).
(2)
Original cost $i; value 1913 fifty cents; selling price $2-result,
taxable profit $i. See § 202 (b) referring back to (a). Or the taxpayer
may pay 1212% flat as stated above. Under the prior Act, stock purchased
for $231,300 in 19o2; worth $I64,48o March I, 1913; and sold for $276,150
in 1916 showed a taxable profit of $44,850. Walsh v. Brewster, 255 U. S.
536 (i92I).

(3)
profit.
(4)
profit.

Original cost $i; value 1913 $3; selling price $2--result, no taxable
See § 202 (b) (3).
Original cost $i; value 1913 $2; selling price $2-result, no taxable
See § 202 (b) (3). Under the prior Act, even though on liquida-

tion the stockholders get twice what they invested, yet if the selling price
was not more than the value on March I, 1913, there is no tax. Lynch v.
Turrish, 247 U. S. 221 (1918).

(5) Original cost $i; value 1913, $2; selling price $i-result, no taxable
profit or deductible loss. See § 202 (b) referring back to (a). Under the
prior Act there is no taxable profit on stock bought in i9o9 and sold at the
same price in 1916, even though the value was less on March I, 1913. Walsh
v. Brewster, 255 U. S. 536 (i921).

(6) Original cost $i; value 1913, fifty cents; selling price 75 centsresult, no deductible loss or taxable profit. See § 202 (b) (2). Under the
prior Act stock received in exchange in 1912 for stock then worth $291,6oo;
worth $148,635 March I, 1913, and sold for $269,346 in 1916 shows no taxable profit. Goodrich v. Edwards, 255 U. S. 527 (192).
(7) Original cost $i; value 1913, fifty cents; selling price $I-result, no
deductible loss. See § 202 (b) (2) and (a).
(8) Original cost $i; value 1913, fifty cents; selling price fifty centsresult, no deductible loss. See § 2o2 (b) (2).
(9) Original cost $i; value 1913, fifty cents; selling price twenty-five
cents-result, deductible loss of 25 cents. See § 202 (b) (2).
(io) Original cost $i; value 1913, $2; selling price 50 cents-result,
deductible loss of 50 cents. See § 202 (b) referring back to (a).

CONSTITUTIONAL, LAw-TAxATION-INCOME AS PROPtRTY.-The words
"property" and "income" are of such character that it is difficult to confine
them within the inflexible boundaries of strict definitions. It has been stated
that "a tax on incomes is not a tax on property, and a tax on property does
not embrace incomes." BLACK ON INCOMES, (Ed. 3) § 36. In Raymer v.
Trefry, (Mass. 1921), 132 N. R. 190, under a statutory proceeding, complaint was made for the abatement of an income tax assessed at the rate
of 2Y% per annum in respect of income received as associate professor in
Harvard University. The Massachusetts constitution, Amendment 44, puts
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income in two classes for purpose of taxation, and then reads: "The General Court may tax income not derived from property at a lower rate than
income derived from property." Complainant contended that as income
derived from annuities was taxed only Iy2%y, income not derived from property could be taxed no more than income derived from property (annuities)
under the above provision. The court held the tax valid, saying: "Salary
is income derived from property." It takes the position that "property" is
to be considered in its broadest sense, and as contracts of labor and service
are protected under the constitution as property rights, citing Bogni v.
Perotti, 224 Mass. 152, the income from such property rights, salary, is also
property. On the proposition that salary is income there seems to be no
dispute. "Income," as defined by Mr. Webster, is "that gain which proceeds
from labor, business, property, or capital of any kind; as * * * the proceeds
of professional business, * * * salary." Webster's Int. Dic. 745, cited in
Mundy v. Van Hoose, lO4 Ga. 292, 299. Salary is income. White v. Koehler, 7o N. J. Law 526. Is income in this sense, then, derived from property?
What constitutes property within the meaning of the Massachusetts constitution? The court holds that property is a word of large import, and
includes even contracts of service, and hence income derived from such contracts is derived from property and under the former decisions of the same
court is property. Opinion of Justices, 220 Mass. 613, 624. "The word
'property' literally taken, is nomen generalissimun, but it is not always so
used." Wells Fargo Co. v. Mayor, 207 Fed. 871, 876. It "extends to every
species of valuable right and interest." Watson v. Boston, 209 Mass. 18, 23.
It "includes everything which goes to make up one's wealth or estate." Carlton v. Carlton, 72 Me. 115. "Labor or the right to labor is as much property
as land or money." Jones v. Leslie, 61 Wash. io7. "But not in the sense
that it can be liable to a property tax." State v. Wheeler, 14x N. C. 773.
"Property is the right and interest which one has in land and chattels to
the exclusion of others." Bouvier, citing 17 Johns. (N. Y.) 283. For further definitions see WORDS AND PHRASES, "Property."
Property has not only a broad general meaning, but also a more limited
significance. Although it may be broad enough to cover the right to work,
the question before the Massachusetts court is the same question that the
Georgia court answered in Savannah v. Hartridge, 8 Ga. 23, 28, saying:
"The point to be decided is, not whether income may not possibly be comprehended under the general name of 'property,' but whether such is its
meaning, and such was the design of the Legislature, in this Act?" The
objections to the decision are that the framers of the constitutional amendment may not have used the word in its general sense when referring to
incomes, and "it is a cardinal principle of constitutional construction to give
to a constitution and its provisions, the meaning, if possible of ascertainment, intended by its framers." Laird v. Sins, 16 Ariz. 521, 524. Under
the view of the Massachusetts court there is practically nothing of value
that is not property and as all income is derived from something of value,
tangible or intangible, all income therefore is derived from property, and
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the provision relating to income not derived from property, is nullified for it
has nothing to be effective upon. By the court's construction of the word
"property" the classification in the constitution is practically eliminated. It
would seem more logical to say that the framers of the provision used
"property" in a more limited sense, and did intend to make such a classification of incomes as their words indicate. "The words of the amendment
are to be construed in such a way as to carry into effect what seems to be
the reasonable purpose of the people in adopting them." Attorney General
v. Methiuel, 236 Mass. 564. There is also the objection that the income is
not derived from the contract of service, but from performance under the
contract. The contract gives a right to render services, but the right to
compensation, to the income, comes into being by performance,-by rendering services, and hence although the contract is property, the income is not
derived from that contract of service, but is the product of the services
themselves. The question remaining is whether the services are property.
"A man's right to labor, * * * or practice a lawful profession, may not be
taken away from him or be restricted by any act of the State, not within its
police powers, such act being considered a deprivation of property within
the constitutional inhibition, State or Federal. Such cases are far from
saying, however, that services actually rendered under such a contract are
themselves property. It is one thing to say that a man's right to engage or
sell his services may, for the purposes of its protection, be considered a
species of property,-and quite another to assert that services actually rendered by one pers6n to another are to be considered property in order to
enlarge remedies for collecting the debt. The right to labor is one thing,the service itself is quite a different thing." Gleasont v. Thaw, 185 Fed. 345.
Although the Massachusetts case seems to have gone a greater length
than any other in its use of the word "property," it is supported by Eliasberg Bros. Co. v. Grimes, 2o4 Ala. 492, holding that income is property within
the meaning of the Alabama constitutional provision limiting the rate to a
certain percentage of the value of the state's taxable property, and by State
v. Pinder, 3o Del. 416, holding that income is property within the meaning
of a provision in the Delaware constitution. But in Waring v. Savannah,
6o Ga. 93, it was held that income was not property within the meaning of a
constitutional provision that taxes must be uniform. In Glasgow v. Rowse,
43 Mo. 479, an income tax was considered not a tax upon property within
the meaning of a constitutional provision requiring taxation on property to
be in proportion to its value, and in 1918 this decision was followed in construing another income tax statute, but by a court divided four to three.
Ludlow-Saylor Wire Co. v. Wollbrinck, 275 Mo. 339. In the Income Tax
Cases, 148 Wis. 456, the court held that property was one thing-income
another. See also Opinion of Justices, 77 N. H. 611; Wilcox v. Commissioners, 1O3 Mass. 544; 1I A. L. R. 313, Note; WoRDs AND PHRAsis, First and
Second Series, Income, Property.
From this brief review of the cases, it is apparent that the words are
a general character, so flexible in their significance, that their true
such
of
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meaning can only be determined by a decision of the highest appellate court
arrived at after a full consideration of the purpose of the provision, the context, the history of the Constitution, and the intent of the Constitutional
Convention, the Legislature, and the people.
W. C. O'K.
Dt:CIARAXTORY JUDGAMNTs.-The subject of declaratory judgments has
received a great deal of attention in the United States during the last few
years, and the interest aroused has resulted in the enactment of statutes in
a considerable number of states authorizing courts to declare the rights of
parties in cases where relief of the conventional sort is inadequate, inconvenient or impossible. Such judgments may now be obtained in California,
St I92I, ch. 463; Connecticut, P. A. i92I, ch. 258; Florida, Laws 1919, No.
75; Hawaii, Laws 1921, Act 162; Kansas, Laws 1921, cl. 168; New Jersey,
Laws 1915, ch. 116, Sec. 7; New York, Laws 1920, ch. 925, See. 473; Wisconsin, Laws 1919, ch. 242.
Following the suggestion first appearing in this Rzvizw (16 MICH. L.
Rzmw 69, December 1917) the Michigan legislature passed the first general
act in this country giving courts of law and equity authority to render such
judgments. PuB. AcTs, 1919, No. i5o; 17 MICH. L. Rv. 688. But when the
first case under the new act came' before the supreme court of Michigan
the court itself raised the question of its constitutionality, and invited briefs
from the attorney general and from some of the known supporters of the
statute, upon the question whether it conferred upon the-courts non-judicial
functions. And in the opinion which the court rendered upon the -ase
referred to, the statute was held to be vulnerable on the point sugg&' id,
and it was declared to be unconstitutional, Justices Sharpe and Clark' tis*
senting. Anway v. Grand Rapids Ry. Co., 211 Mich. 592. See comment on
this case in 19 MiCH. L. Rgv. 86, and 3o YALI L. JouR. 161, and an article
severely criticising it in 5 MINN. L. Rzv. 172, entitled DPCxARAToRy JUDG.
mrNT, by JAmzs ScooNmAxgR of the St. Paul bar.
After the decision in the Anway case, the legislature of Kansas,
undaunted by the adverse action of the Michigan supreme court, enacted the
Michigan Declaratory Judgment Act as a Kansas statute, using for the most
part the exact provisions of the Michigan act, but adding the phrase "in
cases of actual controversy," which did not appear in the Michigan law.
See the text of this statute and comment thereon in 19 MIcH. L. Rpv. 537.
Pursuing the course taken in Michigan, a constitutional attack was made
on the Kansas law in the first case which arose under it. State ex rel. Hopkins v. Grove (Kan. 1921) 2O Pac. 82. By a remarkable coincidence this
case was almost identical with the Anway case in Michigan. In the Michigan case the court was asked to declare whether the plaintiff had a right
to enter into a contract which was possibly prohibited by a penal statute.
In the Kansas case the court was asked to declare whether the defendant
had a right to enter into an office from -which he was possibly prohibited
by a penal statute. In neither case had the party taken any legal step toward
the questionable act,--in Michigan he had not entered into the contract, in
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Kansas he had not entered upon the office. In each case the party wished
an advance ruling by the court before risking the penalty.
The supreme court of Kansas unanimously upheld the validity of the
declaratory judgment act and made the declaration asked. They referred
to the Anway case as setting forth very fully the arguments against and
in
favor of its validity, in the majority and minority opinions, but deemed
it
unnecessary to go over the ground there covered. In regard to the view
of the majority of the court as expressed in the Anway case, the Kansas
court said:
"This view appears to us unsound, and to be the result of confusing
declaratory judgments with advisory opinions and decisions in moot cases,
and perhaps also of an inclination to treat a general practice that has been
long established as having acquired the force of a constitutional guaranty."
The court said that the principle of the declaratory judgment had been
practically approved in Kansas in the recent case of State v. Allen, io7 Kan..
407, where appeals by the state in criminal cases for the purpose of settling
points of law, were held to be proper subjects for judicial cognizance. See
comment on State v. Allen in i9 Micn. L. Rxv. 79.
The supreme court of Kansas has often given convincing demonstration
that remedial progress is not incompatible with judicial soundness or constitutional security. The decision just rendered is a further proof that the
American system of judicial supervision of legislation can be made workable
in a land of rapid social development.
E. R. S.
E .CIVIC PVFORMANC4 A' LAw-REcovay ov FuLT, AmOUNT OV MATUriX

INSTAI .MNT IN SPITr OF PRIOR RPPUDIATON.-Every now and then
one finds

an illustration of what might with propriety be called judicial myopia,-an
inability of the court to see through a phrase or a name to the substance
behind it, with results which to the man in the street are apt, not without
reason, to appear to lack that element of justice and common sense that has
ever been the proud boast of the Common Law. In George W. Blanchard
& Sons Co. v. American Realty Co. (N. H., 1921), 115 Atl. 4, P and D
entered into a written contract which provided that "The vendor agrees to
sell, and does hereby sell, and the purchaser agrees to buy, and does hereby
buy, and agrees to pay for all the pulp timber on a certain tract of land."
It was further stipulated that the timber should all be removed by the purchaser within five years, and that he should pay $booooo for it in four equal
annual installments, payment to be made on the first day of April in each of
the four years immediately following the date of the agreement. D, the purchaser, cut a small quantity of timber and paid the first installment. When
the second installment came due he was sued for it and a judgment rendered against him in George W. Blanchard & Sons Co. v. American Realty
Co., 79 N. H. 295. Soon thereafter, and before the third installment came
due, D notified P that he had abandoned the contract. P refused to acquiesce
in the abandonment and when the time for payment of the third installment
arrived brought suit to recover the full amount thereof. It was held that
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since the written contract was not under seal it could not, in view

title to or
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"license"
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got
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what
that
trees;
interest in the
he did not
trees and by that act acquire title to them; that the fact that
to the full
choose to exercise his license could not deprive P of his right
remained to
contract price since, "when the contract was executed nothing
be done by the plaintiff."
court's
Even the most superficial analysis seems to indicate that the
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has
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and
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Laffee,
v.
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him. See Nowlin Lumber Co. v. Wilson, ii9 Mich.
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46 N. H. 505. Or it may refer to a so-called permission, or right
contracof rights to go upon land, acquired by contract, with a correlative
landowner
the
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contractual
of
series
tual duty or
phrase is,
Such a contract creates no rights or interest in the land, as the
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has
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the
and consequently
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permission. However, such withdrawal of permission renders him
an action for damages for breach of contract (see Wood v. Leadbitter, 13
2 A. C.
M. & W. 838; King v. David Allen & Sons, Billposting, Ltd., [i916]
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for
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a
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54; 13 MicH. L. REv. 4oi) or perhaps
formance if the remedy at law is inadequate. See Hurst v. Picture Theatres
Ltd., [1915] I K. B. i. That such a contract is not fully performed by the
licensor until the full period for which the permission is given has expired
seems too clear for argument. It may be true, as stated by the court in the
principal case, that the mere fact that the seller still has certain negative
obligations does not prove that the contract is still executory (citing Fletcher
v. Peck, 6 Cranch 87, 137), yet a more complete non sequitur could not be
negawell imagined than to say that from this it follows that one to whom
In
contract.
his
performed
fully
therefore
has
attach
tive obligations alone
McCrea v. Marsh, 12 Gray 211, 212-213 it is said, semble, "Assuming that the
plaintiff, by purchase of the ticket from the defendant, obtained permission
to enter the family circle in the Howard Athenaeum, in his own person, and
occupy a place there during the exhibition, yet it was 'only an executory
was
contract.' It was a license legally revocable, and was revoked before it
29
Astm.,
Amusement
Newport
v.
Buensle
in any part executed." See also
be
may
it
Again
445.
B.
Q.
2
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L.
[1897],
Smith,
v.
R. I. 23; Kerrison
used to mean what is called an, irrevocable permission to go upon land,
to conacquired either by a contract to convey or by an ineffectual attempt
contracts
Such
convey.
to
contract
a
as
construed
vey an interest in land,
are specifically enforcible in equity and create an equitable interest which,
in principle at least, is not distinguishable from an easement or a profit, as
the case may be. Duke of Devonshire v. Eglin, 14 Beav.-530; Ashelford v.
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Willis, 194 Ill. 492. In such a case also it seems quite clear that the licensor
has not fully performed his contract in any true sense until the conveyance
has been executed, unless we are willing to admit what the court in the
principal case seems expressly to deny, viz., that an interest in land may be
created without a grant. It must be admitted that this is the effect of some
of the cases, but in them there is present an, element not present here, viz.,
a promissory estoppel. See Rerick v. Kern, 14 S.- & R. 267; Ruthven v.
Farmers Co6perative Creamery Co., 140 Ia. 570; TIPFANYRa AL
[Ed. 2], sec. 349d.

PROPmRTY,

The court in the principal case, cavalierly and with a vagueness characteristic of cases involving licenses, fails to determine the exact nature of the
rights acquired by D. That a correct solution of the problem involved
depends upon such a determination as well as upon other factors, must be
apparent. If the contract is to be interpreted as one intended to assure the
grant of a profit, then we have the case of a contract to convey in which
the money is to be paid in installments at definite- dates, no time being set
for making the conveyance. If to this situation we should apply rule number one laid down by Sergeant Williams in his note to Pordage v. Cole, i
Wm. Saund. 319i, we should have to say that the promises to pay are absolute and independent, and that therefore P is entitled to recover the full
amount of each installment as it matures, no matter what happens. However, it is doubtful whether this rule would be regarded as uniformly applicable by a modern court since it is often in conflict with the underlying
theory of dependency of promises. See e. g. Taul v. Bradford, 20 Tex. 261.
But cf. Busch v. Stromberg-CarlsonTel. Mfg. Co., 217 Fed. 328, 332. Neither
is it reasonable to hold that the promise to pay the last installment and the
promise to convey are mutually concurrent conditions, as is usually held in
cases involving a contract to convey a fee, Beecher v. Conradt, 3 Kernan
roS; Eddy v. Davis, 1i6 N. Y. 247, for if this construction were placed upon
the agreement in the principal case, it would follow that at the time set for
conveyance there would no longer be anything to convey, since the last
installment was not payable until very near the time when the profit was
by its terms to come to an end.
The case seems more nearly analogous to those involving a contract to
grant a leasehold estate at an, agreed rental payable in installments at fixed
dates. In these cases it is quite uniformly held in effect that the execution
of the lease is a condition precedent to the right to rent. If the prospective
lessee refuses to take a lease the landowner recovers simply the value of
his bargain, i. e. the difference between, the agreed rent and the rental value
of the premises. Silva v. Bair, 141 Cal. 599; Post v. Davis, 7 Kan. App. 217;
Cleveland v. Bryant, 16 S. C. 634; Oldfield v. Angeles Brewing & Malting
Co., 62 Wash. 260; Ann. Cas. i9r2 C io5o and note citing other cases.

This

is true even though the landlord has not acquiesced in the refusal to take
a lease but has permitted the premises to remain vacant expecting to hold
the prospective lessee for the rent. See Oldfield v. Brewing and Malting
Co., supra.
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On the other hand if D got simply a series of contractual rights to go
upon P's land, then we have the question as to whether or not D could by
repudiating the contract during the course of performance compel P to do
all in his power to make the most out of the unexercised portion of the
series of rights remaining at the time of the repudiation. In effect it
becomes simply a rather unique case calling for an application of the principle which denies to an innocent contracting party the right to recover
avoidable damages. That the mutual promises in such a contract are not
wholly indepenaent and absolute is apparent when we consider what the
court would in all probability have done had P repudiated or failed wrongfully to fulfill its promise to permit D to cut timber unmolested. It would
seem to be in accord with principle to require P to make a reasonable effort
to dispose of the remainder of the series of unexercised rights after notice
of repudiation or else to have their value deducted from the amount of
damages recoverable in an action for breach of contract. The case from
this point of view is not unlike the employment contract cases in which it is
quite generally held that an employee who has been wrongfully dismissed
is bound to make a reasonable effort to find other employment. Maynard v.
Royal Worcester Corset Co., 2oo Mass. I; Hinchcliffe v. Koontz, 121 Ind.
422; Byrne v. School Dist., 139 Ia. 6x8. Compare also the cases involving
correspondence school contracts in which tuition is made payable in installments at fixed dates, no time being set for the furnishing of instruction.
According to the better rule in such cases, where the pupil repudiates his
contract the school can recover simply damages for breach of contract and
not the face value of the installments. International Text Book Co. v.
Martin, 82 Neb. 4o3; International Text Book Co. v. Roberts, 168 Mich. 5O1
and cases therein cited. Contra, is International Text Book Co. v. Martin,
221 Mass. i. As is said in Payzu Ltd. v. Saunders, [1919] 2 K. B. 581, "what
is reasonable for a person to do in mitigation of his damages cannot be a
question of law but must be one of fact in the circumstances of each particular case."
To allow P to recover the full amount of the installments under these
circumstances is simply to enforce a penalty. If specific performance is
ever to be made available as a remedy at law certainly it should be confined
to cases like those involving the sale of chattels (see 17 MICH. L. Rtv. 283)
in which the legal machinery is adequate to secure at least a fair measure
G. C. G.
of justice for the defendant.

